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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOHNNY MEDINA DURAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900022-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (jurisdiction over criminal convictions less 
than first degree felonies). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Duran's motion to 
dismiss the habitual criminal charge? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's conclusions of law are entitled to no 
deference, and are reversible if incorrect. State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 326, 327 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989). 
STATUTES 
The following statutes will be relied upon and are 
contained in the body of the brief: 
New Mexico Statutes Ann. section 30-2-3 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-103 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2a-3(3) 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-205 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-206 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-8-1001 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from an order denying Mr. Duran's 
motion to dismiss the habitual criminal charge, which order preceded 
the entry of conditional guilty pleas, judgments and convictions for 
two counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, 
second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, 
Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Duran was originally charged with two counts of 
unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, and was also 
charged with being an habitual criminal (R. 5-7). Defense counsel 
submitted two motions to dismiss the habitual criminal charge, 
arguing that dismissal was appropriate because 1) the State could 
not demonstrate that the New Mexico conviction underlying the 
habitual criminal charge would constitute a second degree felony 
under Utah law (R. 24-28); and 2) Mr. Duran did not serve two 
separate periods of confinement for the two convictions underlying 
the habitual criminal charge (R. 52-56). 
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At the first hearing on the motion on July 28, 1989, 
defense counsel argued only the first theory, indicating that if the 
court were unwilling to dismiss the case, the court should 
trifurcate the proceedings, with a phase to determine guilt on the 
distribution charges, a phase to determine the legal sufficiency of 
the New Mexico felony, and then a phase for the jurors to determine 
if Mr. Duran were an habitual criminal (T. 3-4). 
The prosecutor indicated that the issue before the trial 
court was how to evaluate the New Mexico felony under Utah law, 
either by comparing the elements of the New Mexico conviction with 
the elements of a Utah crime, or by evaluating the facts underlying 
the New Mexico conviction and determining which provision of Utah 
law defined the crime involved (T. 5-7). 
The trial court indicated as follows: 
We are not going to retry this case. We are 
not going to try his New Mexico case. It is 
simply something that isn't going to be done. I 
think the only way we can approach this at this 
point is to have you and the State obtain a 
transcript of the plea. I don't know what they 
do there. If they do what we do here in the 
State of Utah, there will be a statement or 
affidavit when he pled guilty. If there isn't, 
there will be a statement of what the elements of 
the crime are and what the facts are to which he 
is pleading. And that will certainly, if that 
exists, that record will indicate what the facts 
were in that case to bring him within the 
elements of the crime in New Mexico; and it will 
be those facts to which he made a plea that will 
determine whether or not if that had been pled 
here, it would have been a second or third degree 
felony. 
.... 
I think we need that to which he made a 
plea. If he made a statement, there may be a 
defense argument whether it was given freely and 
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voluntarily or not. I don't know, but we have to 
have more than that. 
Now, I think now you need a transcript of 
his pleading guilty and see what he pled to, and 
see if there are facts to which he made a plea 
to. And if he did, I will use that to determine 
whether or not if that had been pled here or if 
h€i had been found guilty of those facts here, if 
it would have been a second or third degree 
f€>lony. 
.... 
Okay. I deny the Motion to Dismiss Count 3, 
the crime of habitual criminal. The statute 
76-8-1001 is very clear in its language that a 
crime which if committed within the state would 
have been a felony, second degree felony and so 
forth, would be sufficient to meet the 
requirements. And it doesn't matter what 
New Mexico calls it. It matters what we will 
call it in Utah, and if his actions there, if 
committed here would have been a second degree 
felony, you have met the burden in that regard. 
(T. 9-11). 
At the second hearing on the motion to dismiss the habitual 
criminal count, held on October 17, 1989, defense counsel focused on 
the second theory, arguing that because Mr. Duran#s sentences on the 
two convictions relied on by the State were concurrent, there were 
not two separate periods of confinement to support the habitual 
criminal charge (T.2 2-5). The prosecutor disputed the legal 
accuracy of this argument and submitted documents relating to the 
Utah conviction and the New Mexico felony (T.2 7). 
Defense counsel noted that the trial court had already 
rejected the first argument relating to the translation of the 
New Mexico felony into a Utah felony (T.2 7-8).1 The remainder of 
1. The reasoning of the trial court is somewhat less than 
clear. It appears that the trial court intended to analyze the 
translation of the New Mexico conviction by looking at the facts 
(continued) 
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counsel's argument focused solely on the second theory for 
dismissal, relating i. w'". i 
'New' Mexico felonies (T.2 8-9). 
The court ruled as follows: 
There is no question that there have been 
two convictions, separate from one another. And 
there is no question that there has been two 
sentences imposed, separate from one another. 
And, I guess it really comes down to whether or 
not there is one or two convictions. And this 
Court is going to hold and find that there have 
been two commitments separate and apart from one 
another. 
The Court is often faced with a question on 
multiple counts in sentencing a prisoner, whether 
one has been convicted of ten counts, whether to 
take those and make him serve his time in the 
State Prison, 1 to 15 years to run consecutive1y 
or whether to make those run concurrently. And 
if they are not truly separate counts, then the 
Court would be in error in sentencing either 
consecutively or concurrently. And if they are 
not truly separate counts, then the Court would 
be in error in sentencing either consecutively or 
concurrently. There would have to be a 
conviction on the lessor included offense or the 
offense itself, whichever the law would provide. 
(footnote 1 continued) 
shown in the New Mexico plea hearing and/or the elements of the 
New Mexico crime (T. 9-11). After the prosecutor indicated that she 
would procure the documents necessary to such analysis, but before 
the documents were procured or analyzed, the trial court denied the 
motion (T. 11). The prosecutor continued to voice intent to present 
the documentation, and in fact presented it at the beginning of the 
next hearing, indicating that the documents supported denial of the 
motion to dismiss (T.2 5-6). 
The trial court never returned to analyze the translation 
few Mexico conviction. 
Because this is a question of law, this Court is empowered 
to decide it without regard to the trial court's analysis, Olwell v. 
Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 586-587 n. 1 (Utah 1982)
 t arid should recognize 
that it was the prosecution's duty to demonstrate the applicability 
of the habitual criminal charge, see State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 
149 (Utah 1989); State v. Williams. 651 P.2d 569, 580-582 (Ida. App. 
1982), Relevant transcript pages are attached in Appendix 1. 
In a case where you have totally separate 
incidents, if it were drugs, totally separate 
sales of totally different times, those are 
individual, independent crimes. Each one could 
be tried separately, one from the other, and 
often are. And sometimes they are tried together 
and that sometimes becomes a legal argument that 
we are confronted with, but each one is a 
separate and different crime. 
The most compelling argument you make is the 
argument of giving the man two different trips to 
prison before you are going to hammer him with 
the habitual criminal statute. That is the best 
argument. But as I read this statute, I think it 
is clear from the documents that Mr. Duran has 
besen convicted for two separate crimes, in two 
s€»parate states, has been sentenced for two 
separate crimes, in two separate states, and has 
been committed by two separate Courts, in two 
separate states. And the fact that one of those 
states was good enough to cut him a break and 
say, "We'll let this sentence run concurrent with 
the other sentence," should not be to his benefit 
because the Court could have just as easily said, 
"This would be a consecutive sentence and when 
you finish your term down in New Mexico, then you 
can come up and start your term up in Utah." 
I believe that is what is intended by this 
statute to deal with different crimes, different 
conditions, different sentences and different 
commitments. And the fact that one of the judges 
allowed the sentence in his state to run at the 
same time the other one is running in another 
state, does not negate the applicability of the 
habitual criminal statute. The motion therefore 
is denied. 
(T.2 9-11). 
Defense counsel requested a continuance for interlocutory 
review of the ruling (T.2 11-12), and the trial court denied the 
request (T.2 13). 
After further proceedings, Mr. Duran pled guilty to two 
counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, and the 
trial court accepted the pleas (T.2 63-64). Defense counsel then 
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indicated that the; plea agreement with the State recognized that the 
p l e a w a s c o n d i t i o n a l in IIINII IN iiiiiii in ,. i 111111 i t i p p i ' i i i 1 m 1 I m \ 1111 11 i IL 
criminal issues (T 2 65-86). The court indicated, "They will never 
State iias dismissed it, can make a record on 
that, *- . You have a i
 : f 
:ii t Is dismissed there is nothing to appeal there is no issue." 
(T 2 i id) HI isecutor made i 10 comment concerning the conditional 
nature of plea.2 
SUMMARY Of THE ARGUMENT 
In charging Mr. Duran under the habitual criminal sta t: .\ i I: .e, 
the State relied on a third degree felony conviction from another 
a second 
degree felony in Utah, required che habitual criminal 
statute Additionally, because Mr. Duran did not serve separate 
| j t " [ l i n l ' I I | ( ' l u l l i i n Mill i l I IIIIIII IIIIIII I h i n i 11 t e i ' i s n * s 1 i • 1 in il IIIIIII I  i . Illllllll(, t a t e 
i.n alleging the habitual criminal charge, Mr. Duran's motion for 
dismissal of the habitual criminal charge should have been granted. 
2. 11 i State v. Bobo. 131 Utah Adv Rep. 25 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (per curiam), which was filed after the hearings in this case, 
this Court indicated that the conditional nature of conditional 
pleas must be set forth in the record. Id. at 25. The record 
before the Court :i i i 1 " ; case shows that the prosecutor did not 
dispute the plea bargain understanding that the pleas were entered 
on the condition that Mr. Duran could appeal the denial of motions 
to dismiss the habitual criminal charge (T.2 65-66). While the 
trial court apparently did not understand the concept of the 
conditional plea, the court allowed defense counsel to make a record 
of the conditional plea (T.2 66). Relevant transcript pages are 
included in Appendix 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED 
THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE. 
A. THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE NEW MEXICO FELONY WOULD 
TRANSLATE INTO A SECOND DEGREE FELONY UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-8-1001 provides, 
Any person who has been twice convicted, 
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses at 
least one of which offenses having been at least 
a felony of the second degree or a crime which, 
if committed within this state, would have been a 
capital felony, felony of the first degree or 
felony of the second degree, and was committed to 
any prison may, upon conviction of at least a 
felony of the second degree committed in this 
state, other than murder in the first or second 
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and 
be imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. 
As noted above, the prosecutor argued that translation of 
the New Mexico conviction could be performed by either comparing the 
elements of the New Mexico crime with the elements of Utah crimes, 
or by examining the facts underlying the New Mexico conviction 
(T. 5-6).3 Under either of the modes proposed by the State, the 
3. For examples of the different approaches to translation 
of out-of-state convictions under various habitual criminal 
statutes, see State v. Heaps, 677 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Wash. App. 
1984)("The test for determining the sufficiency of a foreign 
conviction for purposes of the habitual offender statutes is if the 
indictment or information under which the defendant was convicted 
states facts which would constitute the minimum elements of a felony 
in Washington."); People v. Crowson, 660 P.2d 389, 393-396 (Cal. 
1983)(discussing elements and facts approaches, adopting elements 
approach); Martin v. State, 704 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Alaska App. 
1985)(foreign conviction found "substantially similar" to Alaska 
conviction, and supported sentence enhancement; while one might be 
convicted under Alaska law without being subject to punishment in 
foreign jurisdiction, dispositive test was whether any person 
subject to punishment under the foreign jurisdiction's law would be 
punishable under Alaska law). 
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•: - * failed to demonstrate that the New Mexico crime would have 
been ..PI. least a second degree 
The statutory definition of the crime to which Mr. Duran 
is as follows: 
Manslaughter is the unlawful 
being without malice. 
A. Voluntary manslaughter consists of 
manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarre 
in the heat of passion. 
New Mexico Statutes - j (State's ExhiDir -^
The facts relating * ^r 1 ' convictio? rf Mexico 
ii I'.'C11 C O til H I 1 I 
"I got in a fight with Patrick Gonzales, 
stabbed him." 
(Page 4 of transcript inside R 72) , 
Viewing the facts and/or legal definition of the New Mexico 
crime with provisions 
failed < tli.it the New Mexico crime would have been at least a 
-.he second degree , At tho time* that Mr. Duran's 
New Mexico conviction war; entered, Utah code I n. • h '"• 'nl> 
(1975) defined the Utah second degree felony offense of 
nilirr. I i i i i i iht or , a?. 111 II 11 iw. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaugh b =iii : :i f 
the actor: 
(a) Recklessly causes the death of another; 
or 
(b) Causes the death of another under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance for which there Is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse; 
(c) Causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably believes 
the circumstances provide a moral or legal 
justification or extenuation for his conduct 
although the conduct is not legally justifiable 
or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree. 
The current version of Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-206 is 
the same version that would have governed in 1982, and provides as 
follows: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
The levels of intent required in the two Utah statutes are 
explained in Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-103, the current version of 
which would have governed in 1982, and provides, in part, as follows: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully 
with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect ot 
his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person 
acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect 
to a result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist 
or the result will occur. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that its disregard 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard 
of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
under all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally 
negligent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. 
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The risk must be of such a nature m m degree that 
the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
As the Utah Supreme Court noted In State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 
I i " mi!! 1 ., ii I in llt'iin I ) , I II i i l l p ' . l in ill I mi i HI between manslaughter and negligent 
homicide is almost imaginary. Quoting Justice Stewart's dissent: in 
Bogcress v. State, 655 P.2d 654 at 658 (Utah 1982), the Dyer court 
The difference between negligence and 
recklessness is not marked by a sharp analytical 
line. On the contrary, the difference generally 
lies in making a judgment as to where on a 
continuum of unreasonable conduct one's behav i c: r 
passes from negligence to recklessness. In 
essence, it is a matter of judging when conduct 
is no longer just gray but dark gray. 
671 P. 2d at I  48. 
Because the State failed ? demonstrate that the Mew Mexico 
conviction would have been a felony
 5econ(j £egree ol 
serious criiru ~. *' committed ";. I.-J. f. •-• * . il court should have 
ismiss. 
B. THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO SHOW THAT MR. DURAN HAD SERVED SEPARATE 
PERIODS OF CONFINEMENT FOR THE TWO PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS UNDERLYING 
THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE. 
As noted previously , U tali Code Ann.,, section 76-8-1001 
provides, 
Any person who has been twice convicted, 
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses at 
least one of which offenses having been at least 
a felony of the second degree or a crime which, 
if committed within this state, would have been a 
capital felony,- felony of the first degree or 
- 11 
felony of the second degree, and was committed to 
any prison may, upon conviction of at least a 
felony of the second degree committed in this 
state, other than murder in the first or second 
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and 
be imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. 
In State v. Montague. 671 P.2d 187 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court indicated that the legislative intent behind the 
habitual criminal statute was not "reformatory/" but was enacted to 
"make persistent offenders subject to greater sanctions." Id. at 
190. In State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987), the court 
quoted Montague, and explained that the habitual criminal charge 
could lie whether the two felonies underlying the habitual criminal 
charge were sentenced consecutively or concurrently, without 
permitting a criminal offender "two separate opportunities to reform 
after having been incarcerated." Id. at 206. Once again, in 
reaching this conclusion the court focused on the legislative 
intent: "The crux of the statute is that persistent offenders should 
receive greater sanctions, regardless of the order or manner in 
which they serve their prison sentences." Id. at 206. 
If the plain language of the Utah statute required only two 
felony convictions, the analysis of the Utah Supreme Court would 
comport with basic rules of statutory interpretation. However, the 
Utah statute requires two convictions, sentences, and commitments. 
See Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 252 n. 11 (Utah 1988)(Utah 
Supreme Court has "fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to 
every word of the statute."). 
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• reading the plain language of the statute were not 
sut ticient. *-.« sho M , i i l Mi ll'i'iii i i i i i u i i I  ill i m l I p P P I I V I I f e d o l In i n -
habitual criminal the absence of spending two separate periods 
•inement ' • * • elonies underlying the habitual criminal 
charge, extrinsic proof of legislative intent supports that 
conclusion. 
T h e II in. 111 in I  mi in II i mi i nil i in in II I i t n i l i liiMii m i i I in IMI «i in in ( | i,, e n a c t e d i n 
1975 as House Bill 5.1 See Laws of Utah, 1985, chapter 46. 
section As this Court can determine from reading Appendix J to 
1 1 mi 
floor debates on this legislation, the legislature included the 
language "and committed" Utah statute to insure that the 
a 
person had been convicted, sentenced and committed twice, and had 
had, two separate opportunities to reform prior to facing the serious 
habitual
 criminal penaities. 
When the bill was debated ' e House, Representative 
Mitchell moved to cuutJiiu. uut; bin and delete the words "and 
committed," because he was concerned that the language all owed 
offenders to escape the penalty too easily. He argued, "What fnel 
it iloos here- -sometimes people dlo qet felonies and are -i icted. 
Sometimes they aren't sentenced or committed. ,/es , I 
this committing, and I'm wondering if with this committinc 
1 I I I I I I I ill I 1 I l l 111 I I II III III II II II II Il  i l l I II I I III I II I III I I II II i P S III I I I I III I I I III i n I 
committed, might sort of squeezed through the door In the 
interpretation of it." Pages 2 and 3 of transcript of Day 17 of the 
13 -
41st Utah State Legislature, House Floor Debates, disk 4, side 1, 
beginning at 16. Representative Judd spoke in opposition to the 
amendment. While his response referred to the context of multiple 
charges stemming from one criminal episode, he characterized the 
requirement that "the individual [serve] on two separate occasions" 
as the "guts of the habitual criminal statute." Pages 3 and 4 of 
transcript of Day 17 of the 41st Utah State Legislature, House Floor 
Debates, disk 4, side 1, beginning at 16. Representative 
Mitchell's proposed amendment deleting the language "and committed" 
failed. Id. at 5.4 
While this Court may consider Hackford and Montague as the 
law of the case supporting the trial court's denial of Mr. Duran's 
motion to dismiss the habitual criminal charge, because those cases 
are wrongly decided in light of the aforementioned rule of statutory 
construction and legislative intent, this Court may choose to 
certify this case to the Utah Supreme Court for consideration. See 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2a-3(3)("The Court of Appeals upon its own 
motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination 
any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction."). 
4. The Utah Supreme Court has referred to similar floor 
debates to determine legislative intent. E.g. State v. Copeland, 




This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of 
Mr. Duran's motion to dismiss the habitual criminal charge, and 
remand this case to the trial court for withdrawal of the 
conditional plea. I 
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FRIDAY, JULY 28, 1989 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
8:55 A.M. 
THE COURT: This is the time for hearing in 
State of Utah vs. Duran 89-0402. The defendant, Mr. 
Duran, is present here in court with counsel, and the 
state is represented by its counsel. Would you identify 
yourselves please for the record. 
VOICE: Mary Corporon appearing for the 
defendant, Your Honor. 
VOICE: Wendy Hufnagel appearing on behalf of 
the State. 
THE COURT: It is defendant's motion. 
MS. CORPORON: That is correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, there are three 
counts pending in the Information. The first two counts 
are not in dispute today. The motion today is a Motion 
to Dismiss Count 3 of the Information which is the 
habitual criminal charge. As the Court is probably 
aware, the statute requires that there be a previous 
conviction, felony conviction, of at least a second 
degree before the habitual criminal charge could be 
brought in this particular action. There are two 
previous convictions, felony convictions, which my client 
has prior to the one which are pending in this case. 
Those convictions are a Utah third degree and a New 
Mexico conviction for what New Mexico has termed 
Voluntary Manslaughter, which is a third degree felony 
conviction in the State of New Mexico, And I have given 
the Court a copy of and attached to our memorandum, a 
copy of the New Mexico statute. I don't think there is 
any dispute about the fact the previous manslaughter was 
a third degree conviction in the state where the 
conviction occurred. The issue is whether or not that 
previous third degree conviction can be used to satisfy 
one of the requirements of the habitual criminal statute 
and to satisfy the requirement for this Count 3 
prosecution. 
I submit to the Court that, first of all, if 
the conviction in the foreign state is a third degree 
conviction, that the Court should defer to the 
classification in the foreign state and that the Court 
should dismiss Count 3 of the Information because the 
statutory prerequisites are simply not satisfied. If the 
Court is inclined to accept the possibility that that 
third degree conviction should be considered as a 
possible prerequisite for the habitual criminal statute, 
then I think the Court must look to the underlying facts 
of the case. Because obviously if the Court is not 
accepting the classification from New Mexico, then what 
2 
1 I we are looking to is the underlying facts of what has 
2 I occurred in the State of New Mexico which led up to that 
3 I conviction. I would ask the Court then to bifurcate the 
4 J trial as to the habitual criminal portion of the trial 
5 J and require, first, that the State establish not to the 
6 jury but to the satisfaction of the Court the legal 
7 J sufficiency of that prior conviction, and that the State 
8 be required to satisfy, to produce evidence of what 
9 occurred in New Mexico. And if that incident had 
10 occurred in the State of Utah and had been prosecuted in 
11 Utah, it would have resulted in a conviction of second 
12 J degree or higher. 
13 So the procedure which I am proposing to the 
14 J Court is, first of all, that Count 3 should be simply 
15 I dismissed because the conviction in New Mexico is not 
-16 J second degree or higher. If the Court will not do that, 
17 then I am asking for what would really be a trifurcation 
18 J of the trial. That first we would go to trial before the 
19 J jury on Counts 1 and 2, which are the substantive counts, 
20 the new counts. And I believe the case law is clear that 
21 J we cannot present evidence of the habitual offender 
22 problem to the jury until the jury has made a 
23 J determination about Counts 1 and 2, because of the 
24 possibility of prejudice. And I think State vs. James 
25 I case and other cases this year so hold. So I think the 
procedure should be a trial before the jury on Counts 1 
and 2. 
If there is a conviction there and we get to 
the habitual criminal issue, then I think the State must 
present evidence to the Court, to the Bench, to establish 
the legal sufficiency of the previous conviction in New 
Mexico- And then if the Court is satisfied that the 
facts of what occurred in New Mexico will give rise to a 
second or first degree felony conviction in Utah, then 
the issue of the habitual offender should be submitted to 
the jury. I will submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Hufnagel. 
MS. HUFNAGEL: In response, first with regard 
to the first portion of counsel's argument that the count 
should be dismissed, I think the language of our statute 
is itself dispositive of that issue. The habitual 
criminal provision found in Section 76-8-1001, and which 
is contained on the second page of counsel's memorandum 
of Points and Authorities, contains the language of the 
statute itself. "Any person who has been twice convicted, 
sentenced and committed for felony offenses, at least one 
of which offense is having been at least a felony of 
second degree," or — and I think the following language 
is operative here — a crime which if committed within 
this state would have been a capital felony. Felony of 
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the first degree or felony of the second degree. " 
There is no question, and I would stipulate, 
that in the State of New Mexico the crime of which the 
defendant was convicted, which was voluntary 
manslaughter, was characterized in the State of New 
Mexico as a felony of the third degree. I don't think 
that has any bearing on what that offense would be in the 
State of Utah, particularly where the State of New Mexico 
has determinate sentences and has a categorization of 
felony offenses that is nowhere near ours. They have at 
least four categories of felonies in the State of New 
Mexico, or at least they did in 1982 so there 
categorization of offenses is not parallel to that which 
obtains in the State of Utah. 
Be that as it may, even if it were, I think 
that where our statutes say a felony or a crime which if 
committed within this state would have been a felony, at 
least a second degree. And under the law of the State of 
Utah, the crime of voluntary manslaughter is a felony of 
the second degree. So, as far as outright dismissal as a 
matter of law, I think it is clear that the defendant is 
not entitled to that relief. 
With regard to the manner in which the Court 
should proceed in determining whether or not the New 
Mexico conviction would have been the crime of voluntary 
5 
manslaughter in the State of Utah, there is no question 
that it is a matter of first impression in the State of 
Utah. And for this Court to determine how to proceed, 
and I think that is where we need the Court's guidance, I 
think there are two approaches that the Court could take. 
One of which would be to consider the elements of the 
offense under New Mexico law as shown by the New Mexico 
statutes annotated which has been attended to counsel's 
brief, which I think we furnished to her office which 
talks about what voluntary manslaughter was in 1982 under 
the laws of the State of New Mexico, and determining how 
that comports with the elements of the offense under the 
laws of the State of Utah in determining whether or not 
the elements of voluntary manslaughter are met. 
Or, there are some other jurisdictions which 
have suggested that the Court can actually go behind the 
conviction and look at the underlying facts. I think 
either would be sufficient. I think if the Court is 
going to take the first approach, that is something that 
can be determined without a trifurcated hearing. There 
is no question that we need a bifurcated hearing because 
we have a habitual criminal enhancement alleged. But I 
think that if the Court determines it based upon the 
elements of the offense, that is something that will not 
require a trifurcated hearing. If the Court determines 
6 
1 I that it is appropriate to go into the underlying facts, 
2 | then obviously we would be producing evidence as to that 
3 J offense itself in 1982, consisting of eye-witness 
4 testimony and the statement of the defendant given at the 
5 time of the commission of the offense. And that would 
6 involve, I think, a matter which clearly should not be 
7 heard by the jury. I think that is something that the 
8 Court needs to decide and to give us guidance as to how 
9 to proceed. 
10 With regards to the motion, I think insofar as 
11 that goes, we are premature other than to decide which 
12 format we are going to adopt. The decision on that, of 
13 course, can't occur until there has been a conviction on 
14 one or both of the underlying substantive charges before 
15 the Court. But as to counsel's suggestion that, as a 
16 matter of law Count 3 ought to be dismissed, I think 
17 I clearly the statute indicates otherwise. 
18 THE COURT: Ms. Corporon. 
19 MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, the defendant would 
20 concur that the New Mexico statutory scheme by 
21 classifying crimes and classifying felonies is absolutely 
22 nothing like the scheme in the State of Utah. We agree 
23 there is a four-tier felony scheme in the State of Utah: 
24 first degree, second degree, third degree, fourth degree 
25 felony. And my fellow pled guilty in New Mexico to a 
third degree felony, which puts him in the bottom half of 
the severity of the felony categories in the State of New 
Mexico. The State of New Mexico have, for whatever 
reason, classified what the defendant did in this state 
as being in the bottom half of the severity of the 
felonies and it has classified it as a third degree 
felony. 
I would indicate to the Court that if the Court 
is not inclined to dismiss this as a matter of law, and 
if we are going to trifurcate these proceedings — Well, 
that if we are then going to look at the New Mexico 
conviction and determine if it would have been a second 
degree conviction in the State of Utah, that simply 
looking at the language of one statute and the language 
of another in a vacuum, without knowing what the 
defendant did and what happened, is not going to be very 
helpful and is not, I think, what is intended by our 
habitual offender statute. Our statute says that we can 
use the previous conviction as one of the prerequisites 
for the habitual offender offense if we are dealing with 
the crime, which if committed within this state would 
have been a capital felony, a felony of the first degree 
or a felony of the second degree. I don't think we can 
possibly know if a crime would have been a first, second 
or third degree felony or a misdemeanor or no crime at 
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1 all in the State of Utah unless we hear the underlying 
2 J facts and unless we know the facts and the defendant's 
3 I intent at the time of the commission of the offense. 
4 I I would submit to the Court, I would proffer to 
5 the Court that if we get to these underlying facts, my 
6 client advises me there is and was an issue of self 
7 defense as what occurred in New Mexico which may under 
8 Utah law may have resulted in no convictions at all. 
9 THE COURT: We are not going to retry this 
10 case. We are not going to try his New Mexico case. It 
11 is simply something that isn't going to be done. I think 
12 the only way we can approach this at this point is to 
13 have you and the State obtain a transcript of the plea. 
14 J I don't know what they do there. If they do what we do 
15 I here in the State of Utah, there will be a statement or 
16 I affidavit when he pled guilty. If there isn't, there 
17 I will be something on the record. And normally there will 
18 be a statement of what the elements of the crime are and 
19 I what the facts are to which he is pleading. And that 
20 will certainly, if that exists, that record will indicate 
21 J what the facts were in that case to bring him within the 
22 elements of the crime in New Mexico; and it will be those 
23 facts to which he made a plea that will determine whether 
24 or not if that had been pled here, it would have been a 
25 second or third degree felony. 
So before we can go, we need that immediately. 
Do we have a trial date on this? 
MS. HUFNAGEL: We have a trial date, August 
3rd. There are a few other problems with that, but while 
we are on that subject, Your Honor, let me inform you 
that in connection with alleging this offense, in 
discovery proceedings I have provided counsel with copies 
of records which we received from the authorities in the 
State of New Mexico which contain the entire 
investigative report, including the autopsy report and 
subscribed statements of the defendant and witnesses. I 
will additionally check with the Court. I do think 
that the details that I have or the report I have are 
somewhat voluminous. I don't think they contain any 
court transcript, but I do have those transcribed 
statements. 
THE COURT: I think we need that to which he 
made a plea. If he made a statement, there may be a 
defense argument whether it was given freely and 
voluntarily or not. I don't know, but we have to have 
more than that. 
Now, I think now you need a transcript of his 
pleading guilty and see what he pled to, and see if there 
are facts to which he made a plea to. And if he did, I 
will use that to determine whether or not if that had 
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been pled here or if he had been found guilty of those 
facts here, if it would have been a second or third 
degree felony. 
MS. HUFNAGEL: Very well, I will obtain that. 
THE COURT: Okay. I deny the Motion to Dismiss 
Count 3, the crime of habitual criminal. The statute 76-
8-1001 is very clear in its language that a crime which 
if committed within the state would have been a felony, 
second degree felony and so forth, would be sufficient to 
meet the requirements. And it doesn't matter what New 
Mexico calls it. It matters what we will call it in 
Utah, and if his actions there, if committed here would 
have been a second degree felony, you have met the burden 
in that regard. 
MS. HUFNAGEL: With regard to our trial 
setting, if I can just express some difficulties we have 
and this creates a new difficulty. If we are saying we 
are going to proceed to trial and then have a bifurcated 
hearing and it is going to be a jury trial, as I 
understand it at this point, we would have a hard time 
because I am sure I won't be able to get those materials 
from New Mexico and transcribed by the third: 
THE COURT: Are you going to have the jury 
decide the third count? 
MS. HUFNAGEL: Well, that is not up to me. 
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MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, I think that the 
jury would hear Count 1 and 2. The Court would then 
determine whether the underlying facts of Count 3 would 
be second degree or higher in Utah and then would proceed 
to the jury on Count 3. If the Court found it against 
the defendant, I think that is the procedure. 
THE COURT: What facts would you have to 
present in regards to Count 3? What factual issues would 
there be? 
MS. HUFNAGEL: They can still put us to our 
proof of the conviction themselves. 
THE COURT: Other than that, once there is a 
certified copy of the convictions, both in New Mexico and 
here, and once we have the other documents, what is there 
for the jury to decide? 
MS. CORPORON: Well, I am not sure at this 
time, Your Honor. I may not have anything to present, 
but I would need to confer with my client about that. 
THE COURT: The State is saying it needs a 
continuance, I guess. 
MS. HUFNAGEL: I am saying there is no way I am 
going to be able to get those transcripts from the State 
of New Mexico to the Court by August 3rd. 
In addition to this case, there was a motion 
filed for a hearing on entrapment that has never been 
12 
1 I noticed up for a hearing. I was advised yesterday by the 
2 | agent in charge in this case, that one of my chain 
3 | witnesses has been out of state this week and expected to 
4 I be out of state all next week. I am concerned about 
5 that. I have witnesses that are under subpoena from two 
6 different states I am trying to coordinate. 
7 THE COURT: Are you moving for a continuance? 
8 MS. HUFNAGEL: I think that is going to be 
9 necessary at this point. 
10 MS. C0RP0R0N: We don't have any objection to a 
11 I continuance, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Duran, you are confined and if 
13 we grant a continuance, that is going to put that down 
14 I the road just a little bit. You have any objection to 
15 that? 
16 MR. DURAN: No, I don't. 
17 THE COURT: You have a right to a speedy trial. 
18 I If I grant a continuance you would have to waive that 
19 I right. Do you waive your right to a speedy trial? 
20 MR. DURAN: Yes, I do. 
21 THE COURT: Okay, how much time do you both 
22 J need? How much time does the State need to obtain this 
23 information? 
24 MS. HUFNAGEL: I would request 30 days to be 
25 safe, I think. 
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1 I THE COURT: Thirty? 
2 MS. HUFNAGEL: I am going to have to locate in 
3 I whose custody the transcript may be and make arrangements 
4 to get them transcribed down there and shipped up here. 
5 I am not sure how quickly that can be accomplished. I 
6 would suggest 30. I will work with whatever obviously 
7 I the setting is. 
8 MS. C0RP0R0N: Your Honor, I would not have any 
9 objection to the 30 days. 
10 THE COURT: Does your client? Do you, Mr. 
11 I Duran? 
12 MR. DURAN: No. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Then, let's set it in 30 
14 days. How long will it take to try it? 
15 MS. C0RP0R0N: Approximately two days, I would 
16 think. 
1? MS. HUFNAGEL: With the bifurcated. I think 
18 I that includes everything, I think. 
19 THE COURT: And then you will decide whether or 
20 I not you are going to have a jury for the third count? 
21 J MS. C0RP0B0N: Yes, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Whether there is anything there 
23 really. You will just have to decide that. 
24 MS. C0RP0R0N: Yes. 



























give it a No. 1 setting. 
THE CLERK: How about September 12th. 
MS. C0RP0R0N: That would be fine with me, Your 
Honor. 
MS. HUFNAGEL: At 10:00? 
THE CLERK: Yes. 
THE COURT: We have set that far enough down 
the road, don't delay. Do everything immediately to get 
those records. We don't want to delay this anymore. 
Let's pre-try this on the day before, September 
11th at 2:00 in the afternoon. That is a Monday. Now, 
if there is going to be a change of plea of any kind, it 
has to be on or before that date. 
15 
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1989 9:00 A.M. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is the time for hearing in 
State of Utah vs. Duran, 89-0402. Would you identify 
yourselves and who you are representing? 
MS. HUFNAGEL: Wendy Hufnagel appearing for the 
State of Utah. 
MS. C0RP0R0N: Mary Corporon for the defendant, 
Mr. Duran, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The record should show the 
defendant is present. 
MS. CORPORON: May we have his hands released? 
THE COURT: Yes, you can release his hands. 
MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, we have a bit of a 
problem in that a witness that I had subpoenaed for the 
evidentiary hearing this morning has not yet arrived. We 
also have a legal matter before the Court and I would ask 
leave of the Court to proceed with the legal matter and 
the argument on that and then see what's happened with 
the status of the witness. 
THE COURT: Okay. How long is this going- to 
take? 
MS. CORPORON: I think an hour should cover it. 
I don't think the factual testimony is going to be that 
lengthy. 
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1 THE COURT: What are the issues? First of all, 
2 the legal matter, what is that? 
3 MS. CORPORON: The legal matter has to do with 
4 count 3 of the Information which is the habitual criminal 
5 count. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. And what is the other 
7 matter? 
8 MS. CORPORON: And then the other matter is a 
9 Motion to Dismiss for governmental misconduct and we are 
10 alleging that we have had a witness who was subpoenaed 
11 and it was public record. Once our subpoena was filed 
12 for the last trial date, our Return of Service, that we 
13 had a witness subpoenaed in behalf of the defendant and 
14 the government has an informant in this matter. The 
15 witness and the informant encountered each other at the 
16 State* Fair this September and it is my understanding that 
17 the informant physically assaulted the witness and made 
18 statements threatening him about testimony regarding the 
19 defendant's case. It is my understanding also that this 
20. informant is a paid government for the prosecution. 
21 THE COURT: Okay, let's hear your legal matter. 
22 MS. CORPORON: Thank you. Your Honor, we made 
23 a Motion to Dismiss count 3 of the Information which is 
24 the habitual criminal count. The Court heard that 
25 earlier. At that time the motion was based solely upon 
the fact that one of the underlying convictions upon 
which the government would base its case is a New Mexico 
manslaughter conviction which in New Mexico was a third 
degree conviction and not of sufficient degrees to 
support the habitual criminal count of the Information. 
The Court denied the motion at that time but 
ordered that the government supply us with various 
documentation regarding the defendant's previous 
convictions. Now that I have obtained that 
documentation, I would like to renew the Motion to 
Dismiss count 3 of the Information on a separate basis, 
other than what was presented to the Court before as the 
attachments to our motion indicates, that the procedure, 
the prior proceeding before this Court which was for 
theft by receiving. The conviction for that was run 
concurrently with the New Mexico conviction for 
manslaughter. So that Mr. Duran was convicted in New 
Mexico of manslaughter; in Utah of theft by receiving and 
the Utah Court ran his Utah conviction concurrently with 
his New Mexico conviction. 
The habitual criminal statute which is 76-8-
1001, requires-that an individual be twice convicted, 
twice sentenced and twice committed before they are 
subject to the provisions of the habitual criminal 
enhancement. The running of the theft by receiving 
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1 I conviction and currently with the New Mexico conviction, 
2 I means that what we had under Utah law is deemed to be a 
3 J single sentence and a single period of commitment for a 
4 single sentence. Therefore, Mr. Duran's prior 
5 convictions for manslaughter and for theft by receiving 
6 can only be deemed to be one period of sentence and one 
7 I period of commitment by Utah law. And therefore, he 
8 cannot be deemed to be subject to the enhancement penalty 
9 of the habitual criminal statute. 
10 I submitted to the Court a week ago a copy of 
11 the Utah Law Review, Utah Legislative Survey dealing with 
12 the habitual criminal statute at the time that it was 
13 enacted. And I think there is an additional public 
14 policy reason why our motion should be granted that is 
15 explained in that Law Review Article. On page 838 of the 
16 Law Review Article, the portion which I submitted to the 
17 Court, that article indicates that evidently the 
18 legislature felt that criminal defendants should be given 
19 the opportunity of at least two periods of confined 
20 rehabilitation prior to being classified as habitual 
21 criminals. Johnny Duran has been given only one period 
22 of confined opportunity for rehabilitation and that was 
23 when he was sentenced and served concurrent sentences for 
24 one conviction for the two crimes of theft by receiving 
25 and manslaughter. 
The intention of the legislature, I think, in 
enacting this Section 1001 was to give an individual two 
chances in confinement to demonstrate they are capable of 
rehabilitation and capable of changing themselves and 
avoiding criminal conviction in the future before they 
are subject to this enhancement penalty. And in this 
case where Mr. Duran has had only one prior period of 
incarceration, he has not been given that opportunity 
which the legislature deemed appropriate. It is not 
therefore appropriate that he have the habitual criminal 
enhancement and count 3 of the Information should be 
dismissed. He should go forward to trial only on counts 
1 and 2 which are the underlying substantive counts 
regarding the drug transactions or the alleged drug 
transactions. 
THE COURT: Ms. Hufnagel. 
MS. HUFNAGEL: Your Honor, in response to 
counsel's argument today, I am not going to reiterate 
previously what has been my point, which is that in fact 
the -allegation contained in count 3 complies with the 
Utah Habitual Criminal Statute, in that the defendant has 
been twice convicted and committed, one offense of which 
would have been under Utah law a felony of the second 
degree. 
I think that the Utah Law Review article that 
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counsel cites this morning is unpersuasive in that the 
author on page 838 says, "Evidently, the legislature felt 
at least two periods of confined rehabilitation." That 
the defendant should be given the opportunity of at least 
two periods of confined rehabilitation. I think that is 
an assumption on the part of the author. I think that is 
not what the law requires. That is not what the law 
states. It doesn't state that the defendant shall have 
been convicted of two prior felonies and shall have 
served either consecutive periods of confinement or 
separate periods of confinement; but rather the statutory 
authority says, "shall have been convicted and committed 
on two occasions." 
I think that counsel's argument that somehow 
when the Court gives concurrent sentences or different 
Courts give concurrent sentences, that that somehow 
merges the commitments into one, is likewise 
unpersuasive. 
At this time, if I may approach the bench, I 
would present to the Court the materials that I have 
previously presented to the defense, which is a partial 
transcript of the proceedings of the defendant's plea in 
the State of New Mexico and certified copies of documents 
from the New Mexico file. 
I would also like to submit to the Court at 
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this time certified copies of two separate commitments. 
One out of the Third District Court for the State of 
Utah, that being the Third Degree Felony commitment, and 
one being the commitment on the charge of voluntary 
manslaughter out of the State of New Mexico. I would ask 
that those be made part of the record. All of those 
documents have been furnished to defense counsel. But I 
think that clearly the state's evidence in this case, if 
the defendant were convicted of the underlying 
substantive offenses contained in counts 1 and 2 of the 
Information, would support the findings by this Court 
that he is in fact a habitual criminal as that term is 
defined under our statutes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Corporon. 
MS. CORPORON: There are only two convictions 
which the Court can consider as the basis for count 3 of 
the Information. One is the manslaughter conviction in 
New Mexico, which is a third degree in New Mexico. The 
second one is the theft by receiving conviction in Utah, 
which is also a third degree conviction in Utah. The 
Court has already rejected my argument to the effect that 
these constitute two third degree prior convictions that 
are not sufficient for the habitual criminal enhancement. 
However, not only must there be two prior convictions, 
one of them at least of a second degree and the Court has 
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1 found the manslaughter in New Mexico to be second degree 
2 or something which would have been second degree under 
3 J Utah law; but the defendant must also have been twice 
4 convicted, twice sentenced and twice committed. 
5 Section 76-3-401(7) is the section of the Utah 
6 Code pertaining to concurrent sentences and it provides 
7 that whenever a sentence is imposed or sentences are 
8 imposed to run concurrently with other sentences "the 
9 lessor sentence shall merge into the greater and the 
10 greater shall be the term to be served." 
11 Counsel says that my merger argument is somehow 
12 in error, but that is exactly what the Utah law says 
13 J happens when you run sentences concurrently. The lessor 
14 sentence and the greater sentence merge into the greater 
15 J sentence and it becomes as one sentence under Utah law. 
16 Therefore, when the Utah theft by receiving conviction 
17 was run concurrently with the New Mexico manslaughter 
18 conviction, by Utah law they merged, they became one 
19 sentence and one commitment. Mr. Duran therefore had 
20 only one sentence and only one9commitment and only one 
21 opportunity for rehabilitation; and before he is 
22 subjected to the penalties and the enhancement of the 
23 criminal enhancement statute, he is entitled to one more 
24 opportunity of rehabilitation. 
25 This is simply not an appropriate case for 
8 
imposition of the habitual criminal statute or provision 
and I would ask that count 3 be dismissed. 
MS. HUFNAGEL: To respond in one sentence, Your 
Honor. It is the sentences that merge for purposes of 
the time being served. It is not the commitments that 
merge and there is no language in the statute that speaks 
of commitments merging one with another. If we were to 
assume that kind of logic, then we are one commitment to 
be overturned. We would have no commitment on the other 
charge. That is illogical. There are two separate 
commitments, two separate jurisdictions, two different 
dates of commitment. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything further, Ms. 
Corporon? 
MS. CORPORON: No, Your Honor, I will submit 
it. 
THE COURT: There is no question that there 
have been two convictions, separate from one another. 
And there is no question that there has been two 
sentences imposed, separate from one another. And, I 
guess it really comes down to whether or not there is one 
or two convictions. And this Court is going to hold and 
find that there have been two commitments separate and 
apart from one another. 
The Court is often faced with a question on 
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multiple counts in sentencing a prisoner, whether one has 
been convicted of ten counts, whether to take those and 
make him serve his time in the State Prison, 1 to 15 
years to run consecutively, or whether to make those run 
concurrently. And if they are not truly separate counts, 
then the Court would be in error in sentencing either 
consecutively or concurrently. There would have to be a 
conviction on the lessor included offense or the offense 
itself, whichever the law would provide. In a case where 
you have totally separate incidents, if it were drugs, 
totally separate sales of totally different times, those 
are individual, independent crimes. Each one could be 
tried separately, one from the other, and often are. And 
sometimes they are tried together and that sometimes 
becomes a legal argument that we are confronted with, but 
esach one is a separate and different crime. 
The most compelling argument you make is the 
argument of giving the man two different trips to the 
prison before you are going to hammer him with the 
habitual criminal statute. That is the best argument. 
But as I read this statute, I think it is clear from the 
documents that Mr. Duran has been convicted for two 
separate crimes, in two separate states, has been 
sentenced for two separate crimes, in two separate 
states, and has been committed by two separate Courts, in 
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two separate states. And the fact that one of those 
states was good enough to cut him a break and say, "We'll 
let this sentence run concurrent with the other 
sentence," should not be to his benefit because the Court 
could have just as easily said, "This would be a 
consecutive sentence and when you finish your term down 
in New Mexico, then you can come up and start your term 
up in Utah." 
I believe that is what is intended by this 
statute to deal with different crimes, different 
conditions, different sentences and different 
commitments. And the fact that one of the Judges allowed 
the sentence in his state to run at the same time the 
other one is running in another state, does not negate 
the applicability of the habitual criminal statute. The 
motion therefore is denied. 
Okay, now, where are we? 
MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, I had discussed with 
my client prior to this hearing the possibility that the 
Court's ruling may be as it just has been. And he has 
indicated to me that — Well, we have discussed the fact 
and I would indicate to the Court this is a case of first 
impression in Utah. 
First of all, the issue of how to deal with the 
foreign conviction, with a different degree pattern than 
11 
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set this for sentencing on — 
THE CLERK: November 13th at 2:00. 
MS, CORP0R0N: I believe I could do it then, 
Your Honor. 
MS, HUFNAGEL: I am going to be in trial. It 
looks like it is going to go on that day. 
MS. C0RP0R0N: Your Honor, the following week 
would put us into the week of Thanksgiving and I have 
airfare pre-purchased to depart on the 19th and return 
the evening of the 27th. 
(Court and counsel discussing court dates.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Duran, you have a right to be 
sentenced within 30 days by our statute unless there is 
something unusual that comes up. That is a right, 
however, you can waive. Does it matter to you whether we 
sentence you within 30 days? 
MR. DURAN: I waive my rights. I prefer to 
have a little bit more time. 
THE COURT: Let's set this for December 11th at 
2:00. 
MS. C0RP0RQN: Your Honor, I also wanted to 
indicate for the record, one final aspect of the 
agreement I had with counsel, and I believe she 
understood I would be specifically reserving on the 



























Information and the legal issues raised regarding the 
habitual criminal statute, and it will be my intention to 
reserve those for appellate review. 
THE COURT: They have been dismissed. 
MS. CORPORON: That is true, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: They will never hear it. The State 
has dismissed it, but you can make a record on that, if 
you want. 
MS. CORPORON: I would like to make the record, 
Your Honor, and discuss that with my client. 
THE COURT: You have a right to do what you 
want, but if it is dismissed there is nothing to appeal 
there is no issue. 
MS. CORPORON: I suspect that there is a great 
deal of validity in what the Court says, but I would 
still like to reserve. 
THE COURT: If there is anything to appeal, and 
I don't know if Mr. Duran would want you to appeal it. 
What if you lost? 
MS. CORPORON: Well, I prefer not to say what 
THE COURT: You don't need to say anything, Mr. 
Duran. That is on the record. Whatever you do, you do. 
Since it is dismissed, there is not that issue facing Mr. 
Duran or the issue before the Court. 
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HOUSE BILL 51 
HABITUAL CRIMINALS 
by Representative Cannon, Representative Newman 
, Part 10, Chapter 8, Title 76, Utah Code Annotated 
1953 criminals providing procedures 
for and punishment violation by the 
State of Utah. 
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Representative Newman. 
NEWMAN: I make a motion that we commence with the reading of 
the and 
SPEAKER: Are you prepared to speak to us? I don't see the 
first sponsor on the floor. 
NEWMAN: Well, he's left it up to me through all the committees and 
everything else, so I just as well carry the ball here. 
SPEAKER: The motion is that we dispense with any further reading on 
House Bill 51 and allow the sponsors to explain it. All in favor of 
that motion say "aye." 
BODY: Aye 
SPEAKER: Any opposed "no." 
BODY: (no response) 
SPEAKER: The ayes have it. Representative Newman. 
NEWMAN: There has been concern throughout the state of Utah on 
private citizens on the habitual criminal law of people that serve 
more than one prison term and being able to get out sometimes pretty 
easy, and they feel that, that they just go right back to doing what 
it was. And I left passed out on your desk the other day, 
yesterday, prison sentences served. And it gives 271 year, 138 two 
years, 365 and more than 348. And a bunch of the citizens feel, as 
well as so does the Chief of Police of Salt Lake City and also of 
the Salt Lake County, that they would like to see the 
habitual criminal law be put back in the code. It was left out when 
the code was redone and passed in the Legislature before this, and 
they felt like it should be back in it. And that's about all I have 
to say on it. 
SPEAKER: Are there other representatives who wish to speak on this 
measure. We're considering House Bill 51, Habitual Criminals. 
Representative Pace. 
PACE: Mr. Speaker. I haven't had a great deal of practice in the 
area of criminal law, but I do know that one of the problems with 
habitual criminal acts in other states is the fact that it creates a 
relunctance in the part of the, of judges and sometimes prosecuting 
officers to prosecute the final criminal charge because the final 
criminal charge would impose upon them, upon the defendant, a charge 
and rather severe penalty that isn't based upon the charge but only 
upon the fact that they have been tried and convicted and with this 
act tried and convicted three times. As a result, the intensity of 
the prosecution and the direction which might be given to the court 
by the judge is sometimes less vigorous than it might be otherwise 
because they are looking at the problem of the conviction of the 
habitual criminal. I think that in passing this act, we have to 
take into consideration that we may find a few habitual criminals 
but we may also build in factors which will cause the acquittal of 
many people who otherwise would have been convicted of a felony and 
would be a lesser offense than the habitual criminal conviction. 
And so I really question whether we will be doing society any good 
on the whole. Because while we may find some habitual criminal 
convictions, there undoubtedly will be many felonies for which 
people will not be convicted or for which the charge will be reduced 
to a misdemeanor in order to avoid the necessity and the harsh 
penalties of the habitual criminal act. And so, while I can't give 
you any figures, and I don't think any figures could possibly be 
derived because this is the type of thing on which there wouldn't be 
any statistics, I think, fellow representatives, that our action a 
year ago in passing the codification of the criminal code, that 
those that were doing that codification carefully considered this 
problem among others, and I don't really think we've had enough 
experience yet to be making this type of change in that code. And I 
think we ought to seriously consider that before we adopt this 
proposal and make this rather basic change in the designation of 
habitual criminals as defined in this act. 
SPEAKER: Representative Mitchell. 
MITCHELL: Yes, I would like to make an amendment on line 16 of 
page 1. I would like to take out "and committed." We'll strike it 
before "and" and after "committed." 
SPEAKER: Is there a second to that motion? 
MITCHELL: What I feel it does here 
SPEAKER: Representative Mitchell, I didn't hear a second. Is there 
a second? 
SPEAKER: OK, it's been seconded. You may discuss it. 
MITCHELL: What I feel it does here—Sometimes people do get 
felonies and are convicted. Sometimes they aren't sentenced or 
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committed. A lot of times in this committing, and I'm wondering if 
with this committing in it, when a person has committed a couple 
felonies and hasn't been committed, might sort of squeezed through 
the door in the interpretation of it. 
SPEAKER: Is there anyone who wishes to speak on the proposed 
amendment? Representative Judd. 
JUDD: I didn't hear the amendment so I can't really respond to it. 
SPEAKER: The amendment was that the words "and committed" on 
line 16 of page 1 of the bill be deleted so that it would read, "any 
person who has been twice convicted, sentenced for felony offenses 
to any prison, shall upon conviction of a felony committed in this 
state" etc. 
JUDD: I would speak against that amendment. And in speaking 
against that amendment, perhaps I need to tell you how the habitual 
criminal statute works both as to this amendment and also to counter 
what Representative Pace said. I have prosecuted a number of 
habitual criminal informations. As you will note, on the second 
page of the bill, one of the requirements is that, first of all, in 
response to Representative Pace, first of all, you have to convict 
the criminal of the crime that he is under indictment for or under 
the information for; that is, if he has committed a burglary, you 
charge him with burglary, and in the course of your discovery of 
this individual, you discover that in fact he has served on two 
separate occasions in a penitentiary terms of longer than one year, 
so that essentially the element and the really the guts of the 
habitual criminal statute is that requirement that the individual 
have served on two separate occasions for longer than one year. And 
that's why I'm against this amendment. I think that if in fact he 
is just convicted of two felonies, a person, for instance, who might 
be convicted of forgery, under the old statute, he could well have 
in one act committed two violations, two felonies. That is, he, not 
only did he pass a forged check, which is one felony, but he also 
wrote it, he uttered it, in other words, so that that's another 
felony. And many times an individual could be on one separate 
occasions be convicted of two different felonies, so that if in fact 
a person passed one check which he himself had made out, he could 
well, under the terms of Representative Mitchell's situation, be 
convicted of two different felonies and sentenced on both of those 
felonies. Now, in that regard, he would then be serving only one 
sentence, so that that individual, having been convicted and 
sentenced on one occasion, could well, if you allowed this 
amendment, on the next felony be subject to the increased penalty of 
the habitual criminal act. Now the habitual criminal act only comes 
into play when an individual has been convicted and then sentenced 
on two separate occasions and has in fact served. You convict him 
first of all of the crime. And after the jury has returned its 
verdict, then the second page of the information is revealed to the 
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jury, so that the jury then discovers that in fact they have to go 
again trying this same person for the crime of being an habitual 
criminal. And this crime of being an habitual criminal then 
requires that the prosecuting attorney prove, first of all, that 
this same individual on a previous occasion had been convicted and 
on a previous occasion had in fact served time on that conviction, 
and then he has to prove it, the same thing, on another felony and 
on another sentence, so that in reality, the jury, having convicted 
him of the felony for which he is now charged or on what he has now 
been convicted, then this same jury makes a finding based on the 
evidence which is presented as to whether or not he is an habitual 
criminal. Then the judge, under the terms of this statute, would in 
fact sentence him to a term of from fifteen years to life not under 
the original felony but rather under the habitual criminal statute, 
so that there are adequate safeguards, I think more than adequate 
safeguards, if you do not amend the bill. I think that the bill as 
it presently stands is very adequate, and if you begin to tinker 
with it and to in effect delimit its application by in effect 
removing the requirement that he in fact serve, you then create some 
very serious problems as far as the law enforcement community is 
concerned. And I speak against the amendment because I think that 
really it would cripple the entire nature of the bill, and I speak 
in favor of the bill as it is written. 
SPEAKER: Representatives, I don't think it was pointed out to you 
earlier, and maybe it's within my prerogative to do so, and that is 
that the bill was amended in committee and the amendments should be 
there in your book, House Bill 51. There is a motion for an 
amendment before us. Are there other representatives who wish to 
speak to the motion? The motion is that the words on page 1, 
line 16 of the bill "and committed" be deleted. Any further 
discussion on that motion? Representative Mitchell. 
MITCHELL: I would like to suggest you vote for the motion. Here's 
a good example of what I've seen happen. About a year ago, my home 
was broken into. At this time, the individual who was out had been 
sort of put on probation in relation. He can committed a felony 
before this time. He plead guilty in court in relation to the 
burglary in my home. It wasn't two months later that I found him 
walking the streets again, and I think this happens way too many 
times and I think it's time we took a look at this and kept some of 
these people of the street. Thank you. 
SPEAKER: All in favor of the motion which is to delete the words 
"and committed" on page 1, line 16. All in favor of that motion say 
"aye." 
BODY: Aye 
SPEAKER: Any opposed "no." 
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BODY: No 
SPEAKER: The nos have it. The motion fails and the bill is before 
us again for discussion. Now there is a question, these amendments 
which I have here have no name on them and they are not a part of a 
committee report. Were they placed in committee or not? 
Representative Judd, can you answer that? 
JUDD: Mr. Speaker, the bill was not amended in committee. 
SPEAKER: Oh, I'm sorry then. The amendment that had found its way 
to your book has not been included and is not part of the bill. 
JUDD: I think, Mr. Speaker, that they are Representative Brown's 
amendments. 
SPEAKER: Oh, they have no name on. I'm sorry. Representative 
Brown. 
BROWN: Mr. Speaker. I'd like to move we adjourn until two 
o'clock. Is that in order? 
SPEAKER: A recess 
BROWN: Recess 
which have not been offered. I wonder 
whether or not those ought to be considered. 
SPEAKER: All right. It is my understanding that no mention had 
ever been made on them even though they had been placed in your 
book. They are not a part of the bill, and unless someone makes a 
motion, they won't be a part of it. 
: Thank you. 
SPEAKER: Representative Brown, do you wish to ? 
BROWN: Mr. Speaker. I would like to make a motion to amend House 
Bill 51. And in way of background of this amendment, I would like 
to explain that I have gone through the existing code and maybe we 
can go through certain portions of that code to discuss the purpose 
of the amendment. In the criminal code, bribery of a 
official is 
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SENATE DISCUSSION OP THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE 
INTRODUCTION OF BILL AND PROPOSED CHANGES 
: I propose we adopt the 
PRESIDENT: moves that we adopt the committee report 
and then carry amendment that have 
been handed to you. Now, Senator . 
: I'm just going to urge that you adopt the committee 
report. 
PRESIDENT: Senator Snow. 
SNOW: the committee now is making some substantial 
changes that we didn't have a chance to see before, and I don't 
think this kind of bill with amendments ought to be on the 
this calendar. And I, for one, would like to see that it be 
removed. 
PRESIDENT: Maybe before you do that, could we offer an explanation 
as to what the committee has done. When we adopted the new criminal 
code, we removed from it the habitual criminal provision. And that 
was police authorities felt that it was necessary to 
have. So this bill was introduced which the habitual 
criminal provision. Now the way they were drafted and came before 
us in judiciary, it was pretty harsh. So the amendments that you 
have on the copy make it discretionary the court to 
say that he may and we could more thoroughly define the areas in 
which this would come into effect, and they've got to be fairly 
serious crimes before you get into the situation of the habitual 
criminal. And the amendments which the committee adopted were to 
make certain that the individual liberties that the individual 
possessed were really not being abused by this statute. And I think 
with the amendments in, that then this becomes an effective piece of 
legislation to go on or, if you want to call it part of the 
crime that we have. in that 
kind of context. And so I propose the amendments and, with the 
amendments, propose the bill. Now do you have any further 
questions, Senator Snow? OK, the 
SNOW: Are you calling for a question on the bill then? 
PRESIDENT: first of all to adopt the committee 
report. the motion has been placed to adopt the committee 
report by Senator . All in favor say "aye." 
BODY: Aye 
PRESIDENT: Opposed "no" 
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BODY: No 
PRESIDENT: The report is adopted. The bill is before 
us. secretary call the roll on passing House Bill 51 
on . 
SECRETARY: Individual vote 
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